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Abstract 
Twenty years have passed since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and it is time to draw a 
concluding line for monetary policy efficiency in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). We propose a comprehensive treatment of the subject for nine members of the CIS for the 
period of 2000-2009. Four transmission channels are investigated: interest rate channel, 
exchange rate channel, bank lending channel, and monetary channel. First, we design a VAR 
framework for each CIS member-state and investigate the short-run dynamics of the impact of 
each of the four transmission channels on domestic output and inflation. Second, we construct 
Auto Regressive Distributed Lag Models (ARDL) in order to study the country-wise efficiency 
of transmission channels in the long run. Finally, we employ a panel data fixed effects method to 
show how the CIS behaves as a region. Our short-run individual country analysis yields highly 
heterogeneous results. In the long run, however, it’s apparent that broad monetary base (M2) is 
the most influential determinant of aggregate output. Inflation is affected the most by the 
refinancing rate and the flow of remittances. For both output and inflation, exchange rate plays a 
role of a supporting channel. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The Channels of Monetary Transmission: an Overview 
The proposition that policy interventions can affect macroeconomic behavior has become a 
leading line of thought among both researchers and practitioners. It is said that policy-makers are 
able to influence the flow of events in the real economy by targeting specific economic 
aggregates of interest. They achieve this by calibrating certain policy variables – those over 
which they have direct power and control. An intervention into the policy variable then, in 
theory, transmits its innovation into the real economy via a certain channel. While policy 
interventions and end-of-the-day effects on the real economy are largely known and measurable, 
the dynamic that occurs in the transmission channel is quite challenging to assess and to 
measure. The channels of monetary transmission are often called a “black box”, suggesting that 
we know that monetary policy does influence real economic aggregates, but we don’t always 
know how exactly (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
Policy makers typically have two major tools for economic control at their disposal: fiscal and 
monetary policy. Fiscal policy has never been consistenly viewed as a reliable variable for 
macroeconomic stabilization (Mishra, Montiel, and Spilimbergo, 2010). The fiscal channel often 
operates slowly, inefficiently, and usually aggrevates situations by acting as a pro-cyclical 
catalyst of any exogenous shock. It’s not to say that the fiscal arm is completely useless, but 
fiscal policy must be almost universally accompanied by a credible and congruent stance from 
the national central bank. In short, much due to the imperfections associated with the fiscal 
dimension of policy making, monetary policy often takes on the lead role in economic 
stabilization and control. 
It has become conventional to believe that monetary policy indeed affects lives of economic 
agents, although sometimes in an undirect way (Mishkin, 1996). The transmission channels 
through which monetary policy is conducted are often subtle and complex. While the aim has 
always been to target a real variable such as aggregate output or employment, the selection of the 
correct channel of monetary transmission in order to execute the desired plan is often impeded 
by the structural issues of a given economy’s internal context. The story of the channels of 
monetary transmission, although without doubt built upon certain fundamental theoretical blocs, 
is an empirical issue. The workings of each monetary transmission channel (and there are several 
of them) depend on a plethora of factors, ranging from the overall stage of macroeconomic 
development to the nuances of micro-structures of domestic financial markets (Checetti, 1999). 
Those factors differ tremendously in different regions and regimes of the world, thus 
necessisating differentiated and/or regional approaches to the study of monetary transmission 
channels. 
1.2. Description of the Channels of Monetary Transmission 
There are at least seven channels of monetary transmission that we can distinguish: interest rate 
channel, exchange rate channel, bank lending channel, balance sheet channel, asset price 
channel, monetary channel, and expectation channel. Empirically, it has been proven that the 
interest rate channel is the most dominant one for the case of developed economies with high-
quality financial markets. In general, the interest channel is built on a Keynesian view that 
monetary policy can affect real costs of borrowing by changing nominal interest rates. Because 
prices are sticky and require time to adjust, nominal interest rate differentials transform into a 
corresponding adjustment in the real interest rate, which in turn affects spending and investment 
decisions in the economy. 
Contrary to the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel is usually viewed as the most 
important monetary transmission channel in developing countries (Coricelli, Egert, and 
MacDonald, 2005). By performing direct interventions into the foreign exchange market, 
monetary policy makers can achieve a desirable level of the exchange rate. The exchange rate 
will in turn affect aggregate production via the current account channel, by influencing the costs 
of imported and exported goods and their relative price-based trade competitiveness. In addition, 
in countries where domestic agents tend to hold debt denominated in foreign currency (as is the 
case with most developing nations), exchange rate fluctuations can have a substantial effect on 
the agents’ debt portoflios and thus their overall balance sheets. Finally, particularly in 
developing and transmission economies, remittances (finances flowing from abroad) are usually 
the forgotten factor in the analysis of monetary transmission. In light of the inclusion of 
remittances into the picture, we believe that the exchange rate can carry an additional significant 
“wealth effect” on domestic aggregate demand via the flow of the typically dollar-denominated 
remitance. 
The bank lending channel functions on the premise that there exists a pool of bank-dependent 
loan seekers, who wish to obtain funds for various investment and consumption purposes. 
Monetary intervention can alter the the amount of bank reserves, thus changing the total amount 
of money that is available for banks to lend out. The restriction on the total amount of loanable 
funds in turn affects the potential of aggregate domestic investment and consumption. Of course, 
this channel operates with a strict assumption that borrowers do not have other sources of 
funding such as government bonds for bank credit (Walsh, 1998).  
The balance sheet channel is an extension of the bank lending channel, in which we assume that 
borrowers, in order to obtain credit funds from the bank, are forced to pay an interest-rate 
premium over the risk-free rate. That risk premium is based on the borrowers’ own balance sheet 
composition, such as a portfolio of securities on hand and real estate in possession (Mishkin, 
2001). Monetary policy is able to affect the prices on the real estate market and/or the prices of 
stocks via open-market interventions targeting the interest rate. This way a monetary policy 
move can affect the borrower’s collateral potential, and thus the overall quantity of credit that 
banks will be willing to lend out against that collateral. Also, from the point of view of 
Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis, monetary policy can affect aggregate domestic consumption 
through the prism of financial wealth of domestic constituents, which is in turn governed by the 
interest rate dynamics and arbitrage. 
The asset price channel, similar in its logical foundations to the balance sheet channel, allows 
monetary policy makers to affect the total wealth of domestic economic agents. Agents, in turn, 
are able to adjust their purchasing and saving decisions according to their changing wealth 
holdings. This idea can be applied to firm-level investment and to the real estate market. The 
asset price channel matters only if the non-bank financial sector is considerably developed, and if 
market financing is reasonably important on the macro-scale (Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier, 
2006). 
The monetary channel is not a traditional inclusion into the discussion on channels of monetary 
transmission. We found that there was a gap in the classifications of the channels since neither 
the monetary base nor the domestic wage level are consistently included into the analysis. The 
former aggregate is usually viewed as an indirect measure of monetary policy. National banks 
rarely target monetary base as an end goal, but rather tweak money supply in order to achieve the 
desired break-even interest rate via open-market operations. Still, broad money should be 
perceived as an indirect predictor of real economy variables, or at least theoretically. Whether 
this is the case empirically for the CIS region we will discover later in the paper. 
Wages, or more concretely – the growth rate of wages – represents the cost, or the supply side of 
the nominal economy. We acknowledge the fact that neither the minimum wage nor the nation-
wise growth rate of the wages is typically in the hands of monetary policy makers. However, it’s 
important to keep wages in the list of potential determinants of inflation and aggregate output 
more as a representative measure of the supply side of the economy, something which will make 
our analysis more complete. 
Wages, broad monetary base, and remittances are the variables not always considered in 
empirical investigations of the monetary transmission channels. We believe that these three 
variables will add some originality in the perspective on the traditional approach to monetary 
transmission literature. Overall, we will analyze 4 channels of monetary transmission in this 
study: exchange rate channel, interest rate channel, bank lending channel, and the monetary 
channel. Detailed description of the variables used in each channel is available in Section 3.1. 
1.3. The Case of CIS 
After the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, hundreds of millions of people were left 
very much in chaos and disorder on all levels of governance. In order to preserve the unity that 
existed in the Soviet times, the Commonwealth of Independent States was established by Russia, 
Ukraine, and Belarus, and the supranational organization now includes 10 official and 1 
unofficial member. It is still unclear whether the CIS plays any effective role as a governing 
body on a daily basis and carries any significant impact on legislation and/or polit-economical 
directions of its constituents. However, member-states of this group do resemble each other in 
their dynamic of development and nation-building in the past 20 or so years, and thus it has 
become common to view CIS as a distinct economic unit. 
One of the traits that is shared by most if not all of the CIS countries is the fragility of legislation 
and the rule of law, the decease that has plagued the region for much of its independent 
existence. Our interest lies in the economic and financial aspects of legal governance, and on that 
front, although much has indeed been accomplished (like the de juro sovereignty of the national 
banks), incomplete and outdated legal codes coupled with inefficient execution on the low and 
medium administrative levels contribute to an economic and financial environment without a 
solid, complete legal foundation. 
Furthermore, with the imperfections in legal governance of the financial sectors of CIS states 
naturally comes the problem of the large informal sectors of the economy. Corruption and the 
shadow economy are a problem for the CIS, but to be fair that is an ongoing issue for all 
developing economies and countries in transition of this world. With the presense of a large 
nformal economy, formal sources of funding like the ones which will be discussed in this paper 
lose their marginal superiority over the informal routes. As a result, channels of monetary 
transmission can not possible measure (at least not fully) the impact that the informal economy 
has on real macroeconomic aggreagates. This implies that some if not most of transmission 
channels are not operational in the CIS due to the presence of alternative and unregistered 
sources of funding. We can also not discard the importance of remittances that for some of the 
CIS member states are in the highest ranks in the world, such as Tajikistan and Armenia. 
Remittances are not necessarily illegal, but they do represent a somewhat informal channel of 
financing, and they are typically denominated in foreign currencies. 
On the monetary front, CIS member-states almost uniformally confronted years of very high 
inflation (and some countries exhibited textbook examples of hyperinflation) following the 
Soviet Union breakdown. Inflation came as a result of two dominant factors. First, national 
governments in the CIS region were deeply in debt, with the obligations spiralling out of control. 
In order to finance the debt, national banks were required to effectively print more money and 
buy out those government debt obligations. This eventually debased national currencies, forcing 
some states to adobt fixed-exchange or semi-fixed currency regimes; either with respect to the 
American Dollar or to the Russian Ruble. The second factor which caused hyperinflation in the 
CIS was backward wage indexation which was unchanged since the Soviet era (Botric and Cota, 
2006). Extremely rapid wage elevation and a poor system of managing that growth led to 
exploding incomes and opulence of money, which at the end of the day carried less and less 
marginal value. Hyperinflation, by and large, is an issue of the past for members of the CIS. 
However, certain countries like Belarus still have dangerously high inflation rates, ranging from 
20 to 30% annualized. 
Consequently, following the collapse of trust in national currencies due to hyperinflation and 
relative debasement, populations in the CIS began using foreign currencies such as the Dollar in 
their everyday operations. The famous notion of “dollarization” paralyzed monetary policy 
makers in the region, who were not able to effectively perform their duties due to the enormously 
large amount of foreign currency in domestic circulation. Dollarization is still a relevant problem 
for some of the CIS members, however due to managed exchange rate regimes, monetary 
governing bodies have been considerably successful with stabilizing the system and enforcing 
monetary policy at least on some of the available channels. 
Perhaps the most urgent of all problems for today that CIS countries are facing is the 
development of financial markets and the financial sector in general. On many layers, financial 
sector in the CIS is defficient and lagging behind not just the industrialzed states but also the 
developing countries in Eastern-Europe and Asia. First, the overall infrastructure of financial 
intermediation is in need of reform and strengthening. The overall levels of monetization and 
financial intermediation are low, which causes aggregate demand in CIS states to respond little 
to credit or deposit rates. Second, the region is very high in terms of quantities of foreign 
currency-denominated loans to the private sector. Thus, financing decisions are not affected to 
large extent by the interventions into domestic interest rate markets. Third, the banking sectors in 
almost all CIS states suffer from low levels of competion (consolidation of leading national 
commercial banks into groups of “Top-5” or alike). 
It has also become common for many CIS commercial banks, and many economic agents in 
general for that matter, to obtain capital through external financing, thus leaving them indifirrent 
to the performance of domestic monetary and financial indicators. Further, the nonbank financial 
sectors are practically non-existant for most CIS states.  Absense of serious stock and debt 
markets, mortgage markets, insurance industries, hampers the the probability of either the asset 
price channel or the balance sheet channel to work appropriately. In addition, most if not all CIS 
countries must still address the issue of capital account liberalization, since capital mobility in 
certain countries of the region is considerably low (Jamilov, 2012). This is partially explained by 
active policies to prevent currency depreciations in the region (Keller, Richardson, 2003). 
Finally, qualitatively speaking, poor human capital expertise on the fronts of risk management, 
credit risk assessment, and accounting further influence the workings of monetary transmission 
channels in quite a negative way. 
All in all, CIS is a region in transmission with its member-states showing signs of great 
resemblence, both in terms of historical development, and also in the types of problems that they 
are facing nowadays. Incomplete legislative foundations, informal sectors and shadow 
economies, dollarization, noncompetitiveness and consolidation in the banking sectors, capital 
account immobility, underdevelopment of the capital markets, and a growing need for 
transparent governance are among the primary challenges for the CIS now and going forward. 
While analyzing the issue of monetary policy transmission in the CIS, we must look at the issue 
through the prism of the region’s peculiarites which were just mentioned. In light of these 
factors, we expect that the channels that we will measure (interest rate, exchange rate, bank 
lending, and monetary) will not always behave in a way that theory or evidence from 
industrialized states would predict.  
Indeed there have been many papers, both theoretical and empirical in nature, in the field of 
monetary policy transmission. There have been also some studies, both on individual country-
basis and on the CIS as a group, on the channels of monetary transmission for the case of CIS. 
However, the originality of this paper is that nobody, to the best of our knowledge, has 
performed such a comprehensive country-wise and regional analysis employing 3 distinct 
econometric methodologies. We will present the behavior of 4 channels of monetary 
transmission for 9 member states of the CIS over the period of 2000-2009. We will analyze the 
dynamics of monetary transmission channels in the short run using a VAR framework and in the 
long run using an ARDL approach to cointegration. And we will also provide evidence on how 
the CIS performs as a distinct unit via fixed effects panel-data analysis. In the end we will 
highlight the best and the worst performing channels of monetary transmission, and provide 
policy-relevant recommendations and conclusions. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a review on the channels 
of monetary transmission literature. Section 3 describes the data and the countries used in our 
analysis, and lays out the econometric methods which were employed. Section 4 reports the 
short-run and long-run individual country as well as the CIS panel data results. Section 5 offers a 
discussion of our findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Boivin et al. (2011) suggests to categorize the monetary transmission channels into neoclassical 
and non-neoclassical groups. To the former category belongs the path that the interest rate takes 
to the real economy through investment and consumption. The non-neoclassical channels 
function through the change in the supply of credit and how the bank balance sheets respond to 
credit innovations. The relative efficiency of these two channels depends on the degree of 
development of the domestic financial system. 
Mishra, Montiel, and Spilimbergo (2010) provide arguments in favor of the bank lending 
channel as the prime route for monetary policymaking. They argue that apart from the bank 
lending channel, the interest rate channel, the asset channel, and the exchange rate channel are 
limited in their scope and ability by a set of negative factors: absense of well-functioning 
markets for fixed-income securities and equities, weak real estate markets, heavy central bank 
intervention in the foreign exchange markets, and by the very imperfect connections with the 
international capital markets. See (Keller, Richardson, 2003) for the discussion of exchange rate 
regimes in the CIS economies. In addition to the bank lending channel, the balance sheet channel 
is predicted to operate as a financial accelerator through the increased external finance premium 
(Mishra, Montiel and Spilimbergo, 2010). 
Moreover, the bank lending channel is often regarded as the key channel of monetary 
transmission (Cetorelli and Godlberg, 2008). Presumably because banking is always among the 
largest non-energy sources of growth generation in developing economies, and also because 
banks are still the prime channel for obtaining funds. The channel tends to work differently for 
large and for small banks, with the difference typically rationalized by the higher substitutability 
of deposits as sources of funding for the larger institutions. Small banks, on the other hand, have 
a smaller chance of obtaining funds through alternative means. Thus, the bank lending channel 
operates in a discriminative manner with respect to size, balance-sheet wise. (Kashyap and Stein, 
1995, 2000). With respect to the case of CIS, the a priori expectation on the working of the bank 
lending channel is ambivalent: on hand hand, the banking sectors in most CIS countries are 
considerably consolidated, so this particular channel of transmission should not work because of 
the presense of larger banks. In the meantime, it’s improbable that many banks in the CIS are 
global in nature, with most institutions holding assets either domestically or outside the country 
but still relativel close to the home region. The lack of a global nature of CIS banks therefore 
suggests that the bank lending channel should be operational (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2008). 
Further with regards to the bank lending channel, the path from monetary policy aggregates to 
the real economy lies through the availability and cost of bank credit. If the link between 
monetary policy interventions and the availability and the cost of credit is low, then the banking 
sector is not competitive enough and the real cost of bank lending is actually very high due to a 
poor institutional environment. If the link between the availability and the cost of credit and the 
real economy is low then the formal sector of the economy is too small. Note that both bank 
sector non-competitiveness and the dominance of the informal financial sector are two factors 
very much expected in the case of CIS. Therefore, it’s possible that the pass-through from 
monetary policy actions onto the real economy will be weak on both paths. 
Kabundi and Nonhlanhla (2011) provide interesting evidence on the importance of the channel 
of confidence in the case of monetary transmission in South Africa. They built a FAVAR 
framework and concluded that confidence in addition to the interest rate channel play the biggest 
role of explaining the real economy and prices. Also for South Africa, Ncube and Ndou (2011) 
claim that the wealth effect and the credit channel should be targeted for conducting anti-
inflation policies. 
Channels of monetary transmission should not be just operational on a technical side. They must 
also be controled by a credible monetary policy center. Mohanty and Turner (2008) argue that 
credibility and credible monetary policy frameworks are essential in strengthening the efficiency 
of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission in the emerging market economies 
(EMEs). Mukherjee and Bhattacharya (2011) conclude that for the case of EMEs, the interest 
rate channel impacts private consumption and investment. They also decomposed their results 
for the scenarios of with and without inflation targeting, and proved that presense of the inflation 
targeting regime does not alter the main conclusion. 
Another work for the EMEs highlights the importance of having a developed domestic financial 
system (Bhattacharya, 2011). Weakness in the system coupled with a large informal sector in the 
economy leads to weak performance of the traditional channels of monetary transmission. In this 
paper, the most powerful transmission channel was found to be the exchange rate channel, while 
the interest rates had no significant impact on aggregate demand. 
Dollarization in the context of monetary policy has been addressed in Acosta-Ormaechea and 
Coble (2011). They argue that in Chile and New Zealand the traditional interest rate channel is 
more important, while in Peru and Uruguay the most significant channel is the exchange rate 
channel. Horvath and Maino (2006) believe that dollarization has a negative effect on the 
efficiency of the independent interest rate channel of monetary transmission. 
Dollarization, as discussed in the previous section, is also a serious issue for the countries of the 
CIS. Korhonen and Wachtel (2005) claim that domestic prices reflect the changes in the 
exchange rate very quickly; in other words, the speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium is 
fairly high. They argue that this signals the high level of dollarization in most CIS countries. See 
(Balino, Bennet, Borensztein, 1999) and (Sahay, Vegh, 1995) for the discussion of monetary 
policy in a highly-dollarized economies. 
Mohanty (2012) provide an extensive treatment of the monetary transmission channels for the 
case of India, but derive conclusions that are applicable to a much general pool of countries. 
Namely, they argue that deregulation of interest rates, government-led auction-based market 
borrowing programme, development of the short-term money markets, reduction in statutory 
reserve requirements, among other reforms have contributed to the development of the interest 
rate based indicrect instrument for monetary policy management. 
Isakova (2008) conducted a VAR analysis for three Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan). Results of this study show that policy rates passed through to 
money market interest rates without much trouble. However, inflation and aggregate output are 
not significantly affected by the innovations in the policy rates. They conclude that the bank 
lending channel is weak in the case of these three countries. 
Dabla-Norris and Dloerkermeier (2006) analyzed the interest rate pass-through in Armenia and 
concluded that monetary policy rates transmitted well into the market interest rates. However, 
the market rates did not affect the real economy or price dynamics. Also for the case of Armenia, 
but with far-reaching implications for literature in general, Bordon and Weber (2010) 
decomposed the time series into two regimes, one with a highly dollarized economy and the 
other with a low degree of dollarization. They have demonstrated that dollarization negatively 
affects the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission, since policy rates did a far 
greater job of affecting inflation and output in a low-dollarization regime. Thus, for the 
traditional monetary transmission channels to work, it’s possible that the countries of the CIS 
will have to de-deollarize their domestic economies first. 
Bakradze and Billmeier (2007) and Samkharadze (2008) show that aggregate output does not 
respond well to the innovations in the monetary policy variables in the case of Georgia. 
Similarly, inflation is also not affected by monetary policy shocks. The bank lending channel 
appears to be functioning in the correct manner, however bank interest rates do not impact 
aggregate output in a statistically significant way. 
Agayev (2011) conducted a panel data analysis for 10 CIS countries in order to determine the 
factors which explain the region’s inflation dynamics. They found that wages and exchange rate 
innovations do the best job of explaining inflation in the CIS in the long run. In the short run, 
however, changes in the bottom-line monetary base is the best explanating factor of price 
movements. Overall, the exchange rate and the monetary channels seemed to be the best at 
predicting inflation in the CIS. 
With regards to methodologies used in monetary policy transmission studies, most have resolved 
to the traditional VAR framework (Sims, 1980; Blanchard and Quah, 1989; Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1992; Cristiano and Eichenbaum, 1992). Others have used SVAR approaches (Aslanidi, 
2007), and panel data structures (Agayev, 2011). A relatively novel method of studying the pass-
through of monetary policy channels involves an ARDL approach to cointegration (Crespo-
Cuaresma et.al., 2004). Some researches devised structural, DSGE-like models explaining 
macro-dynamics of countries involving numerous policy and market variables (Golinelli and 
Rovelli, 2002). But all in all, VAR analysis seems to be the most preferred method for short-run 
analysis, VECM (if the variables are non-stationary) for long-run investigations, ARDL for the 
case of variable stationarity (which is common for small samples), and panel fixed and random 
effects for a look at a group of several countries. 
Mishkin (1996) presented an exhaustive explanation of all existing channels of monetary 
transmission. Egert and MacDonald (2006) provided an excellent literature review on many 
empirical studies on monetary transmission in developing economies. 
3. Data Description and Econometric Methodology 
 
3.1. Data Description 
For this study we are using annual data for the period of 2000-2009 for 9 countries of the CIS. 
Our data selection has been driven by the availability of reliable information for some members 
of the region. We have compiled the data set for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been 
omitted due to data non-existence. For interpretation purposes, most series have been 
transformed using a natural logarithm. Overall, data was obtained from such sources as CIS 
Stats, OECD, World Bank, St Louis Reserve Bank, Statistical Offices and National Banks of the 
member states of the CIS. The variables were chosen with respect to their theoretical belonging 
to a particular channel of monetary transmission. For example, the refinance rate is part of the 
interest rate channel analysis, while remittances are included into the exchange rate channel 
discussion. Consult Table 1 in the Appendix for a thorough description of the series used in this 
paper. 
3.2. Econometric Methodology 
 
3.2.1. Short-Run Analysis Using VAR 
As noted in the previous section, we will use a VAR framework to demonstrate the short-
dynamics of the responses of our macroeconomic variables (CPI and GDP) to innovations in the 
various policy variables. 
A VAR in the level form will be estimated ala Jamilov (2011). The VAR system in this paper 
will take the following form: 
Z =	AZ + A	Z	 +⋯+ AZ + BX + ε (1) 
where, Z is a vector of n variables, X – vector of deterministic variables; ε – vector of 
innovations. For example, if we want to build a VAR model for the interest rate channel of 
Ukraine, we will use GDP, CPI, and the refinancing rate of Ukraine as endogenous variables, 
with the addition of the federal funds rate as a deterministic exogenous variable, plus the 
constant and the error term. In similar fashion, we will build VARs for all 9 countries and for 
each of the 4 channels of monetary transmission. 
The preliminary VARs are required to determine the correct number of lags in the model, to 
ensure that there is no autocorrelation in the error terms, and that the residuals follow the pattern 
of a normal distribution. With the right number of lags, we construct the final VAR model in 
order to get impulse response functions and variance decompositions of the variables of interest.   
In the preliminary stage, a set of unit-root tests must be carried out to ensure that variables in our 
models have unit roots. Should a variable have a unit root in the level form, stationarity is 
obtained usually by first-differencing. If variables are non-stationary, then we will achieve a 
long-run equilibrating equation by constructing a traditional Vector Error Correction model 
(VEC). Otherwise, we will have to adopt an Auto Regressive Distributed Lag model (ARDL) 
approach to cointegration, since this method doesn’t require the variables to be non-stationary in 
level form. 
As a brief theoretical note, a one-time movement in a policy variable will affect not only the real 
economic aggregates but also the future values of the policy variables via the so-called feedback 
effect. It is important to account for these feedback effects if we want to estimate the monetary 
transmission models correctly. Therefore, an econometric method of vector auto regressions 
(VAR), not a conventional OLS, should be employed. A VAR model and impulse response 
functions would take the feedback effects into account. 
Overall, we have 9 member-states of the CIS, 4 channels of monetary transmission, with 2 macro 
variables (CPI and GDP) and at least 1 and sometimes more policy variables in every channel. 
We will also use the federal funds rate, oil prices, and remittance flows as exogenous variables in 
certain VAR set-ups. In total, we have run 36 VAR models in order to obtain short-run 
coefficients for each country and for each channel of monetary transmission. 
3.2.2 Long-Run Analysis Using ARDL 
There are several reasons why we have decided to use the ARDL approach to cointegration 
(developed by Pesaran et al., 2001) as opposed to the more common VECM to study the long-
run behavior of monetary policy transmission channels. First, this method solves the problem of 
variable endogeneity and the inability to test hypotheses on the estimated coefficients. Second, 
ARDL is far more superior than multivariate coointegration methods in the case of small 
samples, which is important in our case (Narayan, 2005). Second, ARDL models do not require 
the regressors to be non-stationary, and most of our variables will be indeed stationary in level 
form.  
We now present how one of our channels of monetary transmission (we will use the example of 
the interest rate channel) would be represented in the ARDL form: 
 
ln, =  + ∑ α∆ ln ,

 +∑ α	∆,

 + ∑ α∆

 + α ln , + α!", +
α#$, + %  (2) 
 
where m means lag length, lnGDPi,t is the ln-transformed GDP of country i at time t, RR is the 
refinancing rate of country i and time t, and FFR is the US Federal Funds Rate. Similarly, we 
could have built an ARDL representation for CPI with the RR and FFR as model variables. 
Altogether, we will build 2 long-run models for each macro variable (GDP and CPI), for each 
country (9 CIS member states), for each channel of monetary transmission (4 channels). Overall, 
we have run 72 ARDL regressions in order to achieve long-run coefficients for each country and 
for each channel of monetary transmission. 
As noted above, it is not necessary to test our variables for unit root processes. Instead, we can 
proceed with testing for cointegration. The ARDL approach achieves this by presenting an F-
statistic which tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration (H0: b5=b6=b7=b8=0) against the 
alternative hypothesis (H1: b5≠0, b6≠0, b7≠0, b8≠0). For every significance level there are two 
sets of critical values. If the F-statistic exceeds the upper-bound critical value, then the null 
hypothesis is rejected. If the F-statistic is below the lower-bound, then the null is accepted and 
we have no cointegration. Finally, if the F-statistic is between the two bounds then the test has no 
conclusive result. There is another way of testing for cointegration, which is looking at the error 
correction term in the ARDL’s short-run representation (Kremers et al., 1992). If the error 
correction term is statistically significant and negative, it implies that the variables are quick on 
approaching their long-run stabilizing conditions. 
3.2.3.  Panel-Data Analysis Using Panel Fixed Effects 
Apart from attempting to investigate the channels of monetary transmission on individual-
country basis, we have also devised a panel set-up for the period of 2000-2009, consisting of our 
9 member-states of the CIS. We wish to find out how the CIS performs as a region with regards 
to monetary transmission. First, we have to test our panel data for the presence of a unit root. We 
will achieve this by running the Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC, 2002) panel unit root test. This test is 
different from the individual unit root testing that we proposed in section 3.2.1. on individual-
country VAR modeling.  
If variables in our panel set-up are non-stationary, then we will have to resort to advanced panel 
cointegration techniques for non-stationary data. Otherwise, we will employ a long-run panel 
fixed-effects model of the following form: 
 
lnGDPit= αit + β1,itRRit + β2,itLRit + β3,itDRit + β4,itWGit + β5,itlnM2it + β6,itlnERit + β7,itlnREMit + uit  (3) 
 
Consider that in a similar fashion we will devise the panel fixed-effects regression for inflation, 
with CPI as a dependent variable. Note that for the regression of CPI we will also add CPI(-1) – 
the lag of inflation, which will represent inflation inertia, to the list of independent variables. 
Overall, there will be 2 panel fixed effects regressions, for each of the two macroeconomic 
variables (GDP and CPI), which will determine which of the variables is best at explaining 
inflation and output in the CIS. 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Short-run Results for Individual Countries 
We begin to present our short-run individual country results based on the VAR models. All the 
impulse response functions are available in the Appendix. Note that in our VAR set-up, the 
Federal Funds Rate (FFR), oil price (OILP), and remittances (REM) are treated as purely 
exogenous. Thus, an IRF representation for them will not be possible. Also consider that our 
small sample size limits the interpretational importance of the 5% statistical significance. Some 
of the responses will indeed be significant for several periods, and it will add more robustness for 
inference, but we are interested more in the general direction of each response and whether a 
given country will demonstrate any systematic evidence for efficiency in a particular 
transmission channel 
4.1.1. Interest Rate Channel 
Short-run individual country evidence for the interest rate channel is reported in the Appendix, 
under Figures 1 through 9. The primary policy variable for this channel is the refinancing rate. 
The US federal funds rate was taken as an exogenous variable. GDP and CPI are the 
macroeconomic aggregates by default. 
The response of aggregate output to innovations in the refinancing rate in the case of Armenia is 
strongly negative and statistically significant up to the 6th period (Figure 1). Armenian GDP 
declines following a one standard deviation increase in the country’s refinancing rate, which 
suggests that the interest rate channel is operational. The effect of the refinancing rate on 
inflation is almost negligible and not significant. For Azerbaijan, both GDP and CPI do not seem 
to be responding in a noticeable manner to refinancing rate innovations (Figure 2). The same 
conclusion could be applied to Belarus: there is no evidence that the interest rate channel is 
effective (Figure 3). 
For Kazakhstan, the path of the response of both output and prices to the refinancing rate is 
highly unstable, although GDP seems to demonstrate the presence of a price effect in the short 
run as output rises slightly, but then falls until its long-run equilibrium below the pre-innovation 
level (Figure 4). Again, the dynamic is too unstable. For Kyrgyzstan, inflation shows behavior 
similar to the case of Kazakh CPI: unstable and insignificant (Figure 5). However, output seems 
to be increasing following a positive innovation in the refinancing rate, which is surprising from 
the theoretical point of view. 
CPI of Moldova has a significant positive response to the refinancing rate up to the 2nd period 
(Figure 6). Moldavian GDP, similarly to the case of Kazakh GDP, increases slightly following 
an intervention into the refinancing rate market. For Russia, although the effect is not significant, 
the refinancing rate carries a theoretically correct effect on aggregate output, since it declines 
when the interest rate is raised (Figure 7). Russian CPI movement is correlated with the direction 
of refinancing rate innovations, although in a very insignificant manner. For Tajikistan and 
Ukraine, we cannot detect any noticeable trend in the response of either output or inflation to the 
refinancing rate (Figure 8 and 9). 
Overall, only for the cases of Armenia and Russia, domestic output seems to be determined by 
fluctuations in the refinancing rate. Inflation in none of the CIS states, according to our 
calculations, can be managed via the interest rate channel. 
4.1.2. Exchange Rate Channel 
Short-run individual country results for the exchange rate channel are presented in the Appendix 
under Figures 10 through 18. The primary policy variable for this channel is the exchange rate 
between the national currency and the US dollar. Remittances and price of oil were selected as 
exogenous variables. Again, GDP and CPI are indicators of the broad macro-economy. 
Armenian GDP responds positively and significantly to an innovation in the national exchange 
rate up to the 5th period (Figure 10). Inflation on the other hand seems to be unresponsive to the 
exchange rate fluctuations. In case of Azerbaijan, aggregate output rises as the exchange rate 
depreciates for one standard deviation; domestic prices do not react in any noticeable way 
(Figure 11). 
Belarusian domestic aggregate output shows a slight short-run hike following an exchange rate 
devaluation, while inflation suffers a temporary decline (Figure 12). Both variables return to 
their pre-depreciation levels by the 4th period. GDP and CPI of Kazakhstan are not responsive to 
the country’s exchange rate movements (Figure 13). Domestic output of Kyrgyzstan is equally 
unaffected by the ER innovations; the Kyrgyz inflation, however, rises slightly due to one 
standard deviation depreciation (Figure 14). 
In the case of Moldova, both aggregate output and inflation exhibit a significant positive short-
run response to a depreciation of the Leu (Figure 15). Interestingly, after several periods inflation 
declines and even falls below the pre-devaluation level. GDP of Russia increases following a 
currency devaluation, and the effect is significant for 3 periods. Russian CPI falls in response to 
the depreciation, also in a significant way up to the 2nd period (Figure 16). 
Tajikistani GDP does not seem to be responsive to domestic exchange rate innovations (Figure 
17). Inflation, however, has a significant negative short-run response to a one standard deviation 
fall in value of the somoni. In the long run, the exchange rate remains practically unchanged and 
returns to the initial equilibrium. For Ukraine, neither GDP nor CPI react in any substantial way 
to interventions into the exchange rate. 
Overall, the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission, according to our calculations, is 
visibly operational in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Certain degrees of effectiveness are 
observed in Russia and Belarus. 
4.1.3. Monetary Channel 
Short-run individual country results for the monetary channel are available in the Appendix 
under Figures 19 through 27. GDP and CPI are the default indicators of domestic demand and 
inflation respectively. M2 and WG are the policy variables of the domestic supply of broad 
money and the average annualized growth rate of nominal wages, respectively.  
Armenian GDP shows a positive response to an increase in wages, but not to M2. The effect is 
not statistically significant though (Figure 19). Inflation does not seem to be affected by WG, 
while for M2 the dynamic is too unstable and inconclusive, although there is a statistically 
significant price spike in the short run following the increase in the monetary base. For the case 
of Azerbaijan, neither wages nor money seem to be effective at influencing GDP or inflation 
(Figure 20). 
Gross Domestic Product of Belarus displays a significant positive response up to the 4th period to 
an increase in M2 (Figure 21). M2 has a negative but a non-significant effect on inflation. With 
regards to wages, a one standard deviation increase in WG has a stably negative effect on output 
but a positive short-run effect on inflation. Both effects are insignificant. For Kazakhstan, 
domestic output and inflation both increase in the short run due to an impulse of wage growth 
(Figure 22). Broad money supply has no effect on either Kazakh GDP or prices. 
Wages carry a positive, although insignificant, impact on Kyrgyz GDP; the response of inflation 
is too unstable (Figure 23). M2 has no effect whatsoever on output or inflation. In the case of 
Moldova, an increase in M2 has a light positive effect on domestic production and no seemingly 
meaningful effect on prices (Figure 24). Wages cause no response from the dynamic of 
Moldavian GDP, although they initiate a decline in inflation in the short run and then a slight 
recovery. Neither effect is statistically significant, even at the 10% level. 
For Russia, broad money does a poor job of affecting either GDP or CPI (Figure 25). Wages, on 
the other hand, have a significant positive effect on output in the short run (peculiar form of a 
price effect), which is followed by a long-run decline. Inflation follows a similar path: rising in 
the short run due to an increase in nominal wage growth, and falling after several periods. 
Tajikistani WG has a negative effect on inflation and on GDP. In the case of inflation, the impact 
is particularly strong and statistically significant for 2 periods. Both GDP and M2 increase 
slightly due to an expansion in the monetary base, although in an insignificant manner (Figure 
26). For the case of Ukraine, M2 has no effect at all on domestic GDP and CPI. Wages carry a 
positive effect on aggregate output for all periods, while for inflation the effect is negative in the 
short run and positive after the 5th period. 
All in all, for almost every country of the CIS either broad money or nominal wage growth can 
explain at least one of our two macro variables. In general, output has shown more sensitivity to 
monetary variable innovations than inflation. 
4.1.4. Bank Lending Channel 
Short-run individual country results for the bank lending channel are available in the Appendix 
under Figures 28 through 36. For the bank lending channel, which according to many theoretical 
and empirical papers on monetary transmission in developing economies, should be an efficient 
and relevant channel, we are using the deposit interest rate and the lending interest rate as main 
policy variables. GDP and CPI are once again taken as indicators of the overall macroeconomic 
environment. 
For Armenia, the lending rate has no impact on either GDP or CPI (Figure 28). However, output 
shows a considerably negative, and almost completely significant up to the 6th period, response 
to a one standard deviation increase in domestic deposit rates. Inflation initially rises but then 
falls following an innovation in the interest rates on deposits.  For Azerbaijan, there is no visible 
effect of either deposit or credit interest rates on both output and prices (Figure 29). In the case 
of Belarus, domestic inflation increases following a hike in the deposit interest rates, and the 
effect is significant for 2 periods (Figure 30). Prices are not affected by the credit rates, and 
Belarusian output does not react to either lending or deposit rates of interest. In Kazakhstan, the 
bank lending channel doesn’t exhibit any sign of efficiency, as neither deposit nor lending 
interest rates affect GDP or inflation in any way (Figure 31). 
For Kyrgyzstan, the bank lending channel does not present any evidence for functionality (Figure 
32). In the case of Moldova, output responds in a negative way to an increase in domestic deposit 
rates (Figure 33). The effect is not significant, but considerable. No impact is observed on GDP 
from the impulse to LR. Inflation is not affected by the lending rates, while the effect from 
deposit rates is dual: falling inflation in the short run, and then recovery in the medium-long run. 
There is no clear trend and the dynamic is very unstable and follows a cyclical/sinusoidal 
trajectory. 
Innovations in Russian domestic deposit and lending interest rates both negatively affect the 
country’s GDP, and in a statistically significant way up to the 4th period (Figure 34). The bank 
lending channel is extremely homogenous for Russia, since interest rates on credit and deposit 
affect the real economy in much the same way. Inflation has a positive response to an increase in 
either lending or deposit rates. For Tajikistan, LR has no effect whatsoever on GDP or CPI 
(Figure 35). Rise in DR, however, has a visible short-run impact on output and prices. The 
dynamic afterwards is too unstable for any reasonable conclusion to be reached on the working 
of the channel in Tajikistan. Finally, neither lending nor deposit interest rates have any consistent 
effect on GDP and CPI in the case of Ukraine (Figure 36). 
All in all, according to our results, the bank lending channel seems to be operational in Armenia, 
Moldova, and Russia. Again we observe that output is much more flexible to policy innovations 
than is inflation.  
4.2. Long-Run Results for Individual Countries 
We are now presenting results of our ARDL regressions to shed light on the long-run behavior of 
the channels of monetary transmission in the case of our 9 CIS countries. Firstly, we note that all 
of our regressions are cointegrated according the bound testing procedure. F-test results are 
omitted for brevity but are available upon request. We have run all the regressions and 
summarized the results for each country in one single table (Table 2 in the Appendix). We have 
once again investigated 4 channels of monetary transmission (interest rate channel, exchange rate 
channel, bank lending channel, and monetary channel) and used essentially the same variable 
set-ups as in the case of short-run VAR models presented in section 4.1. For example, we are still 
using the domestic refinancing rate as the prime policy variable in the interest rate channel, with 
the federal funds rate as the exogenous variable. Note that for the exchange rate channel, in 
addition to the exchange rate variable itself, we will also present for the first time quantitative 
evidence for using remittances as a channel of transmission. 
For Armenia, the only channel which seems to operate in the long run is the monetary channel, 
through which both M2 and WG significantly affect the nation’s aggregate output. No other 
effect is significant. Belarus demonstrates a high level of long-run workability in the bank 
lending channel. However, only the effect from the lending rate is negative, which is the 
theoretically correct response to a spike in interest rates. In addition, M2 has a positive 
significant effect on Belarusian GDP, and CPI is positively affected by innovations in the 
refinancing rate. 
From Table 2 in the Appendix, we see that flow of remittance has a considerable and positive 
impact on both GDP and CPI of Azerbaijan in the long run. Monetary base (M2) positively and 
significantly affects the country’s GDP, while an increase in the refinancing rate creates a 
significant positive response in the CPI. No other variables present statistically significant 
outcomes. 
For Kazakhstan, the monetary channel seems to be the most important channel of transmission in 
the long run. CPI is affected both by wage growth and by the monetary base, and in a statistically 
significant way. GDP is also affected by the M2. Similarly to the case of Azerbaijan and Belarus, 
Kazakh inflation responds in a positive significant manner to innovations in the refinancing rate. 
Kyrgyzstan exhibits a strong monetary channel, since its domestic output is affected in a 
significant way by the broad money supply, and CPI responds in a positive and significant way 
to a rise in the nominal wage growth rate. Also, flow of remittance has a negative significant 
effect on Kyrgyz CPI. 
Moldovan CPI can only be influenced in a significant way by raising the domestic exchange rate. 
GDP, however, is sensitive both to the bank lending and to the monetary channels. Increases in 
either M2 or WG carry a significant positive effect on Moldova’s GDP, and so does the deposit 
interest rate. Lending interest rates negatively affect GDP in the long run, which unlike the sign 
of the deposit rate impact, is the theoretically correct outcome. 
For Russia, all channels of monetary transmission show some degree of workability in the long 
run. First, domestic refinancing rate affects GDP and CPI in a negative and in a positive way 
respectively. Second, lending interest rates have a significant negative effect on GDP, and a 
significant positive effect on CPI. In response to an increase in domestic deposit rates, Russian 
CPI declines. GDP also responds in a statistically significant way to an increase in M2. Inflation 
is highly responsive both to variations in the exchange rate of the Ruble, and to the flow of 
remittance from abroad. 
Tajikistan shows signs of a working exchange rate channel in the long run, as the exchange rate 
of Somoni affects both the Tajik GDP and CPI. Remittances and domestic interest rates on 
deposit both explain inflation, and cause its decline in the long run. Finally, for the case of 
Ukraine, the refinancing rate has a positive significant effect on both output and inflation.  So 
does the broad money base, as GDP and CPI increase in the long run following an impulse from 
M2. CPI can also be influenced by varying either interest rates on deposits or the domestic 
exchange rate, since both variables carry a significant positive effect on domestic price level. 
By and large, long-run GDP of all CIS countries is responsive to innovations in the broad supply 
of money (M2). All 9 cases show that M2 positively affects GDP in the long run. For inflation 
the situation is different, as there is no universal conclusion. For some cases, CPI is driven by the 
exchange rate, for others – by the refinancing rate or the deposit interest rates. Consistent with 
our finding in Section 4.1, output is a lot more responsive to variations in policy variables than is 
inflation, suggesting that both in the short run and in the long run inflation cannot be 
systematically affected, or explained for that matter, in the region of CIS. Remittance, our 
original addition to the traditional discussion of monetary transmission channels, affects long-run 
inflation in a statistically significant way in 4 of 9 cases, and output only for the case of 
Azerbaijan. 
4.3. Panel Results for CIS as a Group 
We conclude our presentation of results by reporting the outcome from our panel fixed effects 
analysis of the CIS as a distinct group. All our variables are non-stationary of order I(1) 
according to our panel unit root test results, which are omitted for brevity. We have run 2 
equations for our panel: one with GDP and the other with CPI as dependent variable. For the CPI 
regression we are adding an additional variable of CPI(-1), which is the lag of inflation, to check 
on inflation inertia in the CIS. Table 3 has the outcome of the GDP regression, and Table reports 
the numbers for the CPI model. 
For CIS as a whole, output is influenced only by the fluctuations in the exchange rates and by the 
movements in the monetary base. None of our interest rate variables, nor the wage growth rate or 
flow of remittance has a significant effect on GDP. In essence, these panel results are consistent 
with what we achieved for the individual country long-run estimations in Section 4.2: M2 seems 
to have a strong impact over production and output in the CIS in the long run. 
For the CPI regression, we conclude that the refinancing rate, nominal wage growth rate, and the 
flow of remittance carry statistically significant effects on long run regional inflation. Again, this 
outcome is similar to our conclusion following the analysis in Section 4.2: individual country 
results also confirmed that remittances and refinancing rate are good predictors of price 
fluctuations in the long run. Note that, although inflation does have inertia, the effect is not 
statistically significant. Also an interesting observation is that all interest rate variables affect the 
region-wise inflation in a positive way, whereas theory would predict CPI to be inversely related 
to interest rates. 
5. Discussion 
We have achieved much heterogeneity for our short-run results: some countries of the CIS show 
strength virtually in all channels of monetary transmission, while others are effective just in one 
of the channels. In the long run, we can confidently state that GDP is affected by the supply of 
money, in addition to some marginal influence from the exchange rate. CPI is driven mainly by 
the movement in the refinancing rates, flow of remittance, and to some extent by the exchange 
rates and wages. Countries do differ greatly in the relative efficiency of their respective domestic 
monetary policies. However, there are some unifying arguments such as the monetary base being 
a universally strong factor of GDP, or the refinancing rate and remittances being a good predictor 
of inflation.  
We have witnessed once again that the question of monetary transmission channels is indeed 
very empirical and contextual, and depends as much on the country of focus as it does on 
theoretical models and generalizations. We also prove that treating CIS as a region is reasonable, 
since our results from the CIS panel fixed effects regressions do coincide with the individual 
country based VAR model. Our results are, by and large, consistent with the findings of previous 
literature. Flow of remittance, our original introduction to the exchange rate channel of monetary 
transmission, proves to be an important factor for future studies. 
Based on the results of this study and our survey of the practices, failures, and success stories in 
monetary policy-making of CIS states in the past 20 years, we wish to list once again the key 
directions for progress that this region needs to adopt to ensure continuous development of the 
region’s channels of monetary transmission. 
• Use short-term policy interest rates. Based on the success stories of CIS states with 
very efficient interest rate channels of monetary transmission, it is desirable that CIS 
countries, and indeed all developing economies, would focus on policies affecting short-
term policy interest rates, e.g. overnight repo rates. The shorter the duration of those 
rates, the more influential the channel becomes and the easier it is for policy makers to 
quickly and correctly influence market interest rates. 
 
• Adopt inflation-targeting regimes. Although not exactly at the hyperinflation levels of 
early-mid 1990s, inflation rates in some CIS states are still structurally very high, 
especially when comparing with the developing parts of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Strategic shifts towards inflation targeting policy regimes would serve a dual benevolent 
purpose for policy makers: it would not only drag the core inflation rate down, but also 
improve the overall working capacity of the channel of transmission. 
 
• De-dollarize the economy. High degrees of dollarization do not allow monetary policy 
interventions to affect domestic market variables up to a satisfactory level. Elevation of 
trust into the purchasing strength of the domestic currency, credibility of the national 
money issuer (i.e. central bank), transparent and credible expectations on future monetary 
policy stances are all important factors that contribute to the rebalancing of the 
population’s currency portfolio holdings towards the local currency and away from the 
foreign currency anchor. 
 
• Increase risk-premium for external financing. The vice of all interest rate channels of 
monetary transmission is the ease of obtaining funds from the sources alternative to the 
formal route. Policy makers should identify the dominant types of domestic informal 
financing, and attempt to raise the premium that fund-seekers should pay to get access to 
those informal finances; either through bureaucracy, a form of taxation and a mixture of 
financial incentives, or through legal enforcement. 
 
• Minimize the informal sector and the shadow economy. Econometric models of 
monetary transmission channels cannot assess (not in full, at least) the workings of the 
informal sectors of the economy. Coupled with the efforts to increase risk-premium for 
external financing, policy makers need to either eradicate the shadow economy 
completely or to at least make it feasible and beneficial for the informal agents to shift 
their interests towards the formal (legal) sector. Shadow economy minimization is an age 
old struggle but the benefits, which at least include an improvement of the monetary 
transmission channels, are worth the continuous effort. 
 
• Develop domestic capital markets and sources of non-bank financing. For better or 
for worse, banks are still the chief allocators of resources in most emerging economies, 
and certainly in the CIS. Formation of an optimal market for transference of funds from 
those with excess to those with deficit is paramount for fluidity and mobility of the whole 
financial sector. Much focus must be placed on the development of pension funds, 
markets for short-term governmental and non-governmental corporate bonds, markets for 
stocks and equity. Also important is to educate economic and financial agents about the 
value and advantages of non-bank sources of funding. 
 
• Increase competitiveness in domestic banking sectors. Precisely because the 
populations of transition economies do not have alternative ways of formal financing, the 
banking sectors typically become uncompetitive. A monopoly on resource provision 
leads both to sector consolidation and also to artificially high market interest rates. 
Although, typically by legal mandate, the national bank cannot influence market interest 
rates on deposit and/credit directly (it can achieve this only indirectly though policy rate 
innovations), the government can limit bank mergers and acquisitions to protect the idea 
of an “optimal bank size”. It can also place interest rates on state-driven instruments 
(such as mortgage credit through the public/government channel) so low, that the bank-
provided alternatives would seize to seem rational. 
 
• Establish a solid, transparent financial governing framework. Much as a supporting 
caveat to the ongoing technical financial and monetary reform, CIS states must ensure 
that the region is governed by an easy-to-understand and robust legal foundation. Many 
countries in the CIS still do not have a modern law on mortgage lending, or are in need of 
an urgent and considerable pension reform. The problem is that the financial sector is 
developing quicker than the legal framework which supports it. Gaps and inefficiencies 
in the legal code create room for informal activities. It is necessary, however, to not 
overcomplicate legal procedures, which would have an adverse incentive effect such as 
the desire to circumvent complex requirements and seek an easier, once again an 
informal, way out.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to gather the efforts of decades of theoretical and empirical work 
on the channels of monetary transmission and produce a comprehensive review for the case of 
CIS. We have provided an extensive introduction and literature review which identified the most 
common transmission channels and their applicability to the CIS. In the stage of empirical 
analysis, we have studied both the short-run and the long-run performance of 4 channels of 
monetary transmission for 9 countries of the CIS. We have also looked at how the region 
performs as a distinct economic unit, having employed a panel data approach. 
We conclude that broad supply of money (M2) is the only consistent channel through which 
policy makers can affect aggregate output. Meanwhile, flow of remittance and domestic 
refinancing interest rate are the main factors and indicators of inflation. The exchange rate seems 
to be playing a supporting role, both for output and inflation determination. While it is clear that 
the sphere of the channels of monetary transmission is largely an empirical and contextual issue, 
we have also found that CIS does behave like an integral unit from this particular angle.  
Although the region has accomplished a lot in the past two decades, still many challenges remain 
until the local channels of transmission reach its optimal level of efficiency. Among others, 
development of capital markets and non-bank sources of financing, adoption of inflation 
targeting regimes, improvement of the legal framework, and placement of a larger emphasis on 
short-term interest rate management are the questions to address for CIS policy makers in the 
years to come. 
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Figure 1: Response of GDP and CPI to Refinancing Rate – Armenia 
  
Figure 3: Response of GDP and CPI to Refinancing Rate – Belarus 
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Figure 2: Response of GDP and CPI to Refinancing 
Rate – Azerbaijan 
Figure 4: Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Kazakhstan 
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Figure 5: Response of GDP and CPI to Refinancing Rate – Kyrgyzstan 
 
Figure 7: Response of GDP and CPI to Refinancing Rate – Russia 
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Figure 6: Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Moldova 
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Figure 8: Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Tajikistan 
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Figure 9: Response of GDP and CPI to Refinancing Rate – Ukraine 
 
Figure 11: Response of GDP and CPI to Exchange Rate – Azerbaijan 
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Figure 10: Response of GDP and CPI to Exchange 
Rate – Armenia 
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Figure 12: Response of GDP and CPI to Exchange 
Rate – Belarus 
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LNGDP_BEL to LNER_BEL
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of CPI_BEL to LNER_BEL
Figure 13: Response of GDP and CPI to Exchange Rate – Kazakhstan 
 
Figure 15: Response of GDP and CPI to Exchange Rate – Moldova 
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Figure 14: Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Kyrgyzstan 
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Figure 16: Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Russia 
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Figure 17: Response of GDP and CPI to Exchange Rate – Tajikistan 
 
Figure 19: Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Armenia 
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Figure 18: Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Ukraine 
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Figure 20: Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and 
M2 – Azerbaijan 
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Figure 21: Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Belarus 
 
Figure 23: Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Kyrgyzstan 
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Figure 22: Response of GDP and CPI to Wages 
and M2 – Kazakhstan 
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Figure 24: Response of GDP and CPI to Wages 
and M2 – Moldova 
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Figure 25: Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Russia 
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Figure 26: Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – 
Tajikistan 
Figure 27: Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Ukraine 
Figure 28: Response of GDP and CPI to Deposit and  
Lending Interest Rates – Armenia 
 
Figure 30: Response of GDP and CPI to Deposit and  
Lending Interest Rates – Belarus 
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Figure 29: Response of GDP and CPI Deposit and 
Lending Interest Rates– Azerbaijan 
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Figure 31: Response of GDP and CPI Deposit and 
Lending Interest Rates– Kazakhstan 
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Figure 32: Response of GDP and CPI to Deposit and  
Lending Interest Rates – Kyrgyzstan 
 
Figure 34: Response of GDP and CPI to Deposit and  
Lending Interest Rates – Russia 
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Figure 33: Response of GDP and CPI Deposit and 
Lending Interest Rates– Moldova 
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Figure 35: Response of GDP and CPI Deposit and 
Lending Interest Rates– Tajikistan 
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Figure 36: Response of GDP and CPI to Deposit and  
Lending Interest Rates – Ukraine 
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Table 1: Data Sources and Description 
  
Indicator Source and Description Transmission 
Channel 
   
Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) 
Source: OECD, National Bureaus of Statistics; Format: Nominal, 
Annual Average; in % 
Macro Variable 
   
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
Source: CIS Stats; Format: Nominal, Domestic Currency; LN 
Transformation 
Macro Variable 
   
Refinancing Rate (RR) Source: OECD, National Central Banks; Format: 6-month Rates, End-
Year; in % 
Interest Rate Channel 
   
Federal Funds Rate 
(FFR) 
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Online Database; Format: 
Effective Federal Funds Rate, nominal, End-Year; in % 
Interest Rate Channel 
(Exogenous) 
   
Lending Rate (LR) Source: OECD, National Central Banks; Format: End-Year, Average 
Lending Rate; in % 
 
Bank Lending Channel 
Deposit Rate (DR) Source: OECD, National Central Banks; Format: End-Year, Average 
Lending Rate; in % 
Bank Lending Channel 
   
Wage Growth Rate 
(WG) 
Source: OECD, National Central Banks; Format: Gross Average 
Monthly Earnings, Percent Change; in % 
Monetary Channel 
   
Monetary Base (M2) Source: CIS Stats; Format: Nominal, End-of-year, LN Transformation Monetary Channel 
   
Exchange Rate (ER) Source: OECD; Format: Domestic Currency per 1 US Dollar, End-of-
Year, LN Transformation 
Exchange Rate 
Channel 
   
Remittances (REM) Source: World Bank Remittances Factbook 2008, 2011; Format: Total 
Inward Remittance Flow, in USD, Nominal, LN Transformation 
Exchange Rate 
Channel (Exogenous) 
   
Oil Prices (OILP) Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Online Database; Format: 
Spot price per barrel, in USD, Annual-Average 
Exchange Rate 
Channel (Exogenous) 
 
  
 Table 2: Long-run ARDL Estimates of the Channels of Monetary Transmission in individual CIS countries 
 Dependent 
Variable 
Interest 
Channel 
Banking Channel Monetary Channel Exchange Rate Channel 
  RR LR DR M2 WG ER REM 
Armenia GDP -0.03241 -0.10789 0.003136 0.49321 0.012336 -6.7442 1.1154 
CPI -0.13305 0.029878 -0.27944 1.1926 0.10831 9.2648 -0.67652 
         
Azerbaijan GDP -1.0749 0.32143 -0.086 0.77205 -0.02417 -0.77127 0.42941 
CPI 4.2079 1.5718 0.091337 4.2565 -10.3781 -0.12487 1.5576 
         
Belarus GDP 0.027193 -0.2526 0.33208 0.61478 0.004057 0.91783 0.08743 
CPI 1.0724 -2.5356 5.1889 -10.7729 0.16538 -3.4737 -1.7363 
         
Kazakhstan GDP 0.12968 -0.1591 0.018284 0.60873 0.005028 -12.2264 -1.2213 
CPI 2.8766 2.135 -0.40912 1.4938 0.53666 -19.9 -27.925 
         
Kyrgyzstan GDP -0.20092 0.090923 -0.23863 0.41251 0.028863 8.5998 3.5021 
CPI 1.998 -0.31599 -0.01535 2.2517 0.75434 12.5628 -4.1365 
         
Moldova GDP 0.12351 -0.6562 0.17436 0.68782 0.013584 5.1249 -0.16673 
CPI 1.2194 -10.9836 1.9765 1.2155 -0.31324 8.1786 0.16672 
         
Russia GDP -0.08053 -0.16297 0.10564 0.66078 0.001362 2.055 0.44869 
CPI 0.64986 1.661 -1.1322 -1.7035 0.27264 -6.7306 -11.3705 
         
Tajikistan GDP -0.39436 -0.37563 -0.39966 0.63523 0.030577 5.4776 -0.10471 
CPI 1.5514 -1.3845 -2.2224 4.7645 0.15076 10.9657 -15.8348 
         
Ukraine GDP 0.19143 0.12031 1.8635 0.70479 0.018636 -29.7124 -9.598 
CPI 3.4232 -0.60575 2.3894 14.4865 -0.70358 35.0952 4.5702 
Note: RR – refinancing rate, LR – lending rate, DR – deposit rate, M2 – broad monetary base, WG – 
annual wage growth, ER – exchange rate, REM – remittances. Bold formatting indicates statistical 
significance of the coefficient at the 5% level. For example, the impact of the refinancing rate on the 
CPI of Azerbaijan is 4.2079: statistically significant at the 5% level. 
  
 
Table 3: Panel Fixed Effects Estimates for the GDP Determinants in the CIS 
Dependent Variable: LN_GDP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2000 2009   
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 70  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 2.473668 0.455185 5.434422 0.0000 
LN_ER 0.390588 0.106693 3.660861 0.0006 
LN_M2 0.659864 0.014310 46.11061 0.0000 
WG -0.000358 0.000793 -0.451608 0.6533 
DR -0.001239 0.004514 -0.274427 0.7848 
LR 0.008848 0.005782 1.530349 0.1316 
RR -0.003931 0.003813 -1.030912 0.3070 
LN_REM 0.013141 0.014203 0.925220 0.3588 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.998682     Mean dependent var 8.797067 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998376     S.D. dependent var 2.057362 
S.E. of regression 0.082903     Akaike info criterion -1.965434 
Sum squared resid 0.384883     Schwarz criterion -1.515735 
Log likelihood 82.79019     F-statistic 3264.478 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.979005     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Note: RR- refinancing rate; DR – deposit rate; LR – lending rate; WG – nominal 
wage growth rate; LN_ER – natural log of the exchange rate vis-à-vis US Dollar; 
LN_M2 – natural log of the broad monetary base; LN_REM – natural log of the 
flow of remittances in USD. 
 
 
  
Table 4: Panel Fixed Effects Estimates for the Inflation Determinants in the CIS 
Dependent Variable: CPI   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2009   
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 63  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -41.15838 21.20753 -1.940743 0.0582 
CPI1 0.036606 0.046927 0.780072 0.4392 
RR 0.699298 0.127161 5.499297 0.0000 
DR 0.266550 0.288744 0.923137 0.3606 
LR 0.075246 0.231706 0.324748 0.7468 
WG 0.202738 0.056461 3.590758 0.0008 
LN_ER 3.030569 4.244551 0.713991 0.4787 
LN_M2 1.287421 0.806225 1.596851 0.1169 
LN_REM 2.040335 0.790227 2.581962 0.0129 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.926820     Mean dependent var 10.56206 
Adjusted R-squared 0.905476     S.D. dependent var 9.687898 
S.E. of regression 2.978514     Akaike info criterion 5.224983 
Sum squared resid 425.8343     Schwarz criterion 5.735253 
Log likelihood -149.5870     F-statistic 43.42291 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.200179     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Note: CPI1 indicates inflation inertia, i.e. the lag of CPI(-1); RR- refinancing rate; 
DR – deposit rate; LR – lending rate; WG – nominal wage growth rate; LN_ER – 
natural log of the exchange rate vis-à-vis US Dollar; LN_M2 – natural log of the 
broad monetary base; LN_REM – natural log of the flow of remittances in USD. 
